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Cost-Benefit Analysis and the Environment 
 
Cass R. Sunstein*
 
Abstract 
 
 This review-essay explores the uses and limits of cost-benefit analysis in the 
context of environmental protection, focusing on three recent books: Priceless, by Frank 
Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling; Cellular Phones, Public Fears, and A Culture of 
Precaution, by Adam Burgess; and Catastrophe: Risk and Response, by Richard A. 
Posner. The review-essay emphasizes three principal limitations on the use of cost-
benefit analysis. First, it is important to distinguish between the easy cases for cost-
benefit analysis, in which the beneficiaries of regulation pay all or almost all of its cost, 
from the harder cases, in which the beneficiaries pay little for the environmental 
protection that they receive. In the harder cases, net welfare gains and distributional 
advantages are possible even if environmental regulation fails cost-benefit analysis. 
Second, there are possible uses, in the environmental context, of maximin rather than 
cost-benefit analysis, especially when regulators are attempting to control catastrophic 
risks where probabilities cannot be assigned. An Anti-Catastrophe Principle makes sense 
for such situations. Third, human beings are citizens, not merely consumers, and this 
point requires abandonment of the willingness to pay criterion in some contexts. 
 
In the United States, cost-benefit analysis (CBA) is in the ascendancy. For over 
twenty years, American presidents have required agencies to perform CBA for major 
regulations; indeed, they have told agencies to regulate only if the benefits of regulation 
justify its costs.1 Congress has also shown considerable interest in CBA, most 
prominently in the Safe Drinking Water Act, which asks agencies to produce quantitative 
assessments of both costs and benefits. For their part, federal courts have adopted a series 
of principles that promote CBA, saying that if Congress has not been clear, agencies may 
consider costs, take account of the substitute risks introduced by regulation, and exempt 
trivial risks from governmental control.  
                                                 
* I am grateful to Elizabeth Emens, Charles Larmore, Martha Nussbaum, and Richard Posner for extremely 
valuable comments on an earlier draft of this review. 
1 The developments discussed in this paragraph are traced in Cass R. Sunstein, Risk and Reason 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). 
In its enthusiasm for cost-benefit analysis, the United States provides a sharp 
which has shown inte e interest in a quite different organizing 
principle for environmental protection: the Precautionary Principle.2 According to the 
Precautionary Princip entific uncertainty—
even if it is not yet clear that environmen l risks are serious. A central point of the 
Precautionary Principle is to reco ons of existing knowledge and to 
protect against harm that cannot yet be established as such. 
 in cost-
benefit
long with improvements in terms of visibility, 
                                                
contrast to Europe, ns
le, regulation is required even in the face of sci
ta
gnize the limitati 
CBA and the Precautionary Principle can lead in radically different directions. For 
example, many Europeans argue that the consequences of genetic modification are 
uncertain, that real harm is possible, and hence that stringent regulation is readily 
justified. By contrast, many Americans respond that the likely benefits of genetic 
modification are far greater than the likely harms and that stringent regulation is therefore 
unsupportable. Or consider global warming. Many European leaders have argued in favor 
of precautions, even extremely expensive ones, simply to reduce the risk of catastrophe. 
But under President George W. Bush, American officials have called for continuing 
research on the costs and benefits of controlling greenhouse gas emissions. 
The tension between CBA and the Precautionary Principle raises serious 
uestions about the theory and practice of environmental protection. To engageq
 analysis, regulators must make difficult and often speculative judgments about the 
likely effects of alternative regulatory strategies.3 The easiest task is often the 
identification of costs, but even here there are formidable empirical problems. It is 
difficult to project the expense of regulations of different levels of stringency, especially 
because environmental protection often spurs technological innovation, greatly reducing 
the cost of pollution reduction. The identification of benefits presents even harder 
empirical problems -- and knotty normative and conceptual ones as well. At a minimum, 
agencies must estimate the savings that are likely to result from regulation, including 
reductions in mortality and morbidity, a
 
2 See, e.g., Arie Trouwborst, Evolution and Status of the Precautionary Principle in International Law 
(Kluwer Law International, 2002); The Precautionary Principle in the 20th Century: Late Lessons from 
idelines to govern and to standardize the use of cost-
/omb/inforeg/regpol.html#rr 
Early Warnings (Poul Harremoes et al. eds.) (London: Earthscan, 2002). 
3 The Office of Management and Budget has issued gu
benefit balancing. See Office of Management and Budget, Regulatory Analysis, Circular A-4 (September 
17, 2003), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov
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recreati
gencies to engage in multiple 
acts of
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on, aesthetics, animal welfare, property values, and more. When science leaves 
room for doubt, as it often does, agencies typically specify a range of possibilities, 
representing low-end estimates and high-end estimates in addition to the best “point” 
estimate. Agencies might, for example, project that a certain regulation will save as many 
as eighty lives each year and as few as zero, with a preferred estimate of twenty-five.4 
These numbers inevitably involve a degree of guesswork. 
After specifying the likely benefits, CBA requires a
 conversion, assigning economic values to human lives, human morbidity, and a 
range of harms to the environment. Typically American agencies assign monetary values 
on the basis of private “willingness to pay” (WTP).5 For example, the Environmental 
Protection Agency (EPA) values a human life at about $6.1 million, a figure that comes 
from real-world markets.6 In the workplace and for consumer goods, additional safety has 
a price; market evidence is investigated to identify that price. The $6.1 million figure, 
known as the value of a statistical life (VSL), is a product of studies of actual workplace 
risks, attempting to determine how much workers and others are paid to assume mortality 
hazards. Suppose that people must be paid $600, on average, to eliminate risks of 
0; suppose, for example, that workers who face risks of that magnitude generally 
receive $600 in additional wages each year. If so, the VSL would be said to be $6 
million. Where market evidence is unavailable, agencies often produce monetary 
valuations on the basis of contingent valuation surveys, which ask people how much they 
are willing to pay to save coral reefs or endangered species, to eliminate a risk of chronic 
bronchitis or curable lung cancer, and much more. Drawing on market evidence and 
contingent valuation studies, the EPA has recently valued a case of chronic bronchitis at 
$260,000, an emergency hospital visit for asthma at $9,000, hospital admission for 
pneumonia at $13,400, a lost work-day at $83, and a specified decrease in visibility at 
$14.7
 
 
s, 1993). 
ashington, DC 2002). 
4 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, in Risk and Reason (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2002). 
5 See W. Kip Viscusi, Fatal Tradeoffs (New York: Oxford University Pres
6 See Frank Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling, Priceless: On Knowing the Price of Everything and the Value 
of Nothing (New York: The New Press, 2003). 
7 See Cass R. Sunstein, The Cost-Benefit State 145 (American Bar Association: W
3 
Once a CBA is produced, what should be done with it? The most ambitious 
answer is that agencies should adopt regulations only when the likely benefits exceed the 
likely costs—and that if several regulations meet this test, agencies should select the one 
that “maximizes net benefits.” On this approach, CBA provides a clear rule of decision, 
one by which regulators should be bound. A more cautious response would be that 
agencies should generally require benefits to exceed costs, and also seek to maximize net 
benefit
In this essay, I approach these questions through a discussion of three illuminating 
books that offer radically different approaches to environmental protection. Frank 
Ackerman and Lisa Heinzerling believe that CBA is a hopelessly crude tool, one that 
 Burgess uses the 
s, but that they need not do so; on this view, the outcome of the CBA provides a 
presumption but no more. The presumption could be rebutted by showing that the 
particular situation justifies a departure from the result indicated by CBA—as, plausibly, 
in cases in which poor people would stand to gain a great deal. A still more cautious 
approach would be that in deciding what to do, agencies should consider the outcome of 
CBA alongside such other variables as they deed relevant. There are important 
differences between those who would make CBA determinative and those who would 
merely make it relevant. But even on the most cautious understandings of the role of 
CBA, government’s choices would be significantly affected by the translation of 
environment benefits into monetary equivalents. 
To say the least, it is highly controversial to say that people’s protection against 
environmental risks is properly measured by their WTP to avoid those risks. It is at least 
equally controversial to use WTP as the basis for policies protecting endangered species, 
nature, and wildlife. But the Precautionary Principle raises serious problems of its own. 
How much precaution is the right level of precaution? Are costs relevant to the answer? 
In any case human beings face a number of risks, not simply one, and any effort to reduce 
one risk might well increase another risk. Is it possible, even in principle, to take 
precautions against all risks, rather than a subset? If all risks cannot be reduced at once, 
how should regulators set priorities? 
 
buries indefensible judgments of morality and politics.8 Drawing on the war on terrorism, 
they argue for the Precautionary Principle instead. By contrast, Adam
                                                 
8 See id. 
4 
controv
and wh
s stand to gain from environmental protection, they 
ersy over cell phones to suggest that the Precautionary Principle capitulates to, 
and even promotes, baseless public fears.9 Objecting to what he sees as excessive fear of 
new technologies, Burgess argues for careful attention to scientific evidence and for 
regulation only when the risk is real. Richard Posner argues for CBA and economic 
analysis in a context in which it seems least promising: catastrophic risk.10 He contends 
that global warming, and other potentially catastrophic problems, cannot sensibly be 
approached without a disciplined effort to quantify and monetize both costs and benefits. 
But where Ackerman and Heinzerling see CBA as an excuse for regulatory inaction, 
Posner invokes CBA on behalf of aggressive controls on greenhouse gases and other 
sources of potentially serious danger. Indeed his central goal is to draw private and public 
attention to catastrophic risks that are exceedingly unlikely to come to fruition. 
 Building on the arguments made by Burgess and Posner, I shall mount a qualified 
defense of CBA here. Without some sense of both costs and benefits—both nonmonized 
and monetized—regulators will be making a stab in the dark. Human beings have a great 
deal of difficulty in assessing risks, making them prone to both hysteria and neglect; 
CBA does not supply definite answers, but it can help to establish which risks are serious 
ich are not.11 By contrast, the Precautionary Principle approaches incoherence. 
Because risks are on all sides of social situations, and because regulation itself increases 
risks of various sorts, the principle condemns the very steps that it seems to require.  
But building on the arguments made by Ackerman and Heinzerling, I shall 
suggest that there are two serious problems with CBA. The first is that WTP is sometimes 
an inappropriate basis for environmental policy. Human beings are citizens, not merely 
consumers, and their consumption choices, as measured by WTP, might be trumped by 
their reflective judgments as citizens. In any case, WTP is dependent on ability to pay; 
when the poorest members of societie
should be protected even if their poverty ensures that their WTP is low. The second 
problem is that regulators cannot always assign probabilities to environmental outcomes. 
                                                 
9 See Adam Burgess, Cellular Phones, Public Fears, and a Culture of Precaution (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2004). 
10 See Richard A. Posner, Catastrophe: Risk and Response (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004). 
11 See Allan Gibbard, Risk and Value, in Values At Risk 94 (Douglas MacLean ed.) (New Jersey: Rowman 
and Allanheld, 1986), for an exploration of “a  principal rationale for wanting something like risk-cost-
benefit analysis: for seeking a way to regiment our judgments about risk, and so to avoid the blatant 
ties of unaided common sense.” irrationali
5 
If probabilities cannot be assigned, regulators are unable to engage in CBA; they might 
do well to follow the maximin principle, taking steps to avoid the worst-case scenario. 
This point helps pave the way toward a narrower and more refined use of the 
Precautionary Principle, one that has important real-world applications and that provides 
a valuable complement to approaches based on CBA. 
 
I. Monetization and Its Discontents 
 
Ackerman and Heinzerling do not object to efforts to specify the range of 
outcomes associated with alternative courses of action.12 Their principal objection is to 
the WTP criterion. Insisting that human deaths are not mere “costs,” Ackerman and 
Heinzerling contend that CBA is morally obtuse. They argue that a well-functioning 
emocr
 are 
wildly 
              
d acy should respect the informed judgments of citizens, rather than aggregating 
private consumption choices. Ackerman and Heinzerling much prefer the Precautionary 
Principle, which, in their view, is “a more holistic analysis ” that argues for regulation in 
the face of scientific uncertainty and that is “committed to fairness within and beyond this 
generation” (p. 234). 
 Ackerman and Heinzerling are aware that many people have turned to CBA 
because of widely publicized studies that purport to show a high level of arbitrariness in 
modern regulation.13 According to such studies, regulations in the United States
inconsistent. Sometimes the United States spends $100,000 (or less) to save a 
human life. Sometimes it spends tens of millions. Cost-benefit supporters ask: Shouldn’t 
nations be devoting their resources to serious health problems rather than trivial ones? If 
a nation can spend ten million dollars to save one thousand lives, shouldn’t it do that, 
rather than wasting the money on a similarly priced program that saves only one or two 
people? In any case human beings make many errors in assessing risks, using heuristics 
and demonstrating biases that make them exaggerate some dangers and underestimate 
                                   
w 
03) 
12 I discuss their book for a popular audience in Cass R. Sunstein, Your Money or Your Life, The Ne
Republic 27 (March 15, 2004); my treatment here borrows from that discussion. 
13 The most well-known is John F. Morrall III, A Review of the Record, Regulation, November/Decmebr 
1986, 25, 30, Table 4. For an updated treatment, see John F. Morrall III, Saving Lives: A Review of the 
Record, 27 J. Risk and Uncertainty 221 (20
6 
others.14 These errors seem to be replicated in existing policies; CBA might be defended 
as a promising corrective to blunders in citizens’ perception of risk. In these ways, 
interest in CBA has been fueled less by contentious claims of value than by the pragmatic 
suggestion that it can assist in more intelligent priority-setting.15
Ackerman and Heinzerling believe that the attack on the current system is based 
n misleading studies, burying controversial and indeed implausible judgments of value. 
rue, some regulations hey do prevent serious 
(nonfat
their central claims, then, is that the standard discount rate should 
o
T do not prevent many deaths, but t
al) harms to human health and also harms to ecosystems. The resulting benefits 
should not be disparaged. More fundamentally, Ackerman and Heinzerling argue that the 
key studies find low benefits partly because they greatly “discount” future gains to life 
and health. Everyone agrees that a dollar today is worth more than a dollar in twenty 
years; economists use a standard “discount rate” (often 7% annually) to convert future 
dollars into current equivalents. In calculating the benefits of regulation, they use the 
same discount rate for lives saved and illnesses averted. Ackerman and Heinzerling 
contend that this approach wrongly shrinks the value of regulations that will save people 
in the future. One of 
not be applied to future savings in terms of life and health. 
 Suppose that their arguments are right—that once economic values are properly 
assigned to environmental gains, few existing regulations will be condemned as requiring 
huge investments for trivial benefits. Regulators still might want to use cost-benefit 
analysis to improve current decisions.16 Ackerman and Heinzerling complain that to do 
this, they will have to produce a dollar value for a human life—and any such effort will 
be arbitrary, offensive, or worse. They reject the view that WTP, based largely on 
workplace studies, produces information that agencies should use. In their view, workers 
                                                 
14 A good collection is Heuristics and Biases: The Psychology of Intuitive Judgment (Thomas Gilovich et 
al. eds) (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002). For use of this idea in (qualified) defense of cost-
benefit analysis, see Gibbard, supra note. 
15 David M. Driesen, The Economic Dynamics of Environmental Law (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2003), 
offers a powerful criticism of cost-benefit analysis insofar as it offers a static account of both costs and 
benefits and fails to see that regulation and other forces often produce innovation, thus reducing the 
efit analysis as such. See 
 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001). 
expense of environmental protection. I believe that this argument is best taken as a reason for skepticism 
about existing figures about likely costs, rather than as an attack on cost-ben
Matthew Adler, Cost-Benefit Analysis, Static Efficiency, and the Goals of Environmental Law, 31 B. C. 
Environmental Affairs Law Review 591 (2004). 
16 See W. Kip Viscusi, Rational Risk Regulation
7 
often have little information about the risks that they face, and hence they cannot be 
charged with consciously trading hazards against dollars. Even when workers are 
informed, they may have few options and hence little choice. If they accept a job with 
significant hazards for a low premium, it is not because they are genuinely free to choose. 
ntext. About 3000 people died 
om th
evaluating risks. While experts focus on the number of deaths at stake, most people are 
Some anomalies in the empirical literature are highly relevant here. Nonunionized 
workers have sometimes been found to receive little or nothing for the reduction of 
statistical risks, and African-Americans have been found to receive much less than white 
people do.17 Does it follow that regulators should treat the lives or nonunionized workers, 
or African-Americans, as worth especially little? Ackerman and Heinzerling add that the 
key studies ask only how much individuals care about risks to themselves. They ignore 
the fact that many of us value the lives of others too. I might be willing to pay only $60 to 
eliminate a 100,000 risk that I face, but I might be willing to pay much more than that to 
eliminate that risk from my child’s life, and substantial amounts to help reduce the risks 
of my friends. Altruism is ignored in the current calculations.  
 Ackerman and Heinzerling also contend that statistically equivalent risks should 
not be treated the same, because people’s valuations of mortality risks depend not only on 
the probability of harm but also on their nature and their co
fr e terrorist attacks of 9/11—a much smaller number than die each year from 
suicide (30,500), motor vehicle accidents (43,500), and emphysema (17,500). Ackerman 
and Heinzerling approve of the fact that the reaction of the United States to the 9/11 
attacks was not based on simple numerical comparisons. Drawing on work by 
psychologist Paul Slovic,18 Ackerman and Heinzerling emphasize that the risk judgments 
of ordinary people diverge from the risk judgments of experts—not because ordinary 
people are stupid or confused, but because they have a different normative framework for 
especially averse to risks that are unfamiliar, uncontrollable, involuntary, irreversible, 
                                                 
17 John D. Leeth & John Ruser, Compensating Wage Differentials for Fatal and Nonfatal Injury Risk by 
Gender and Race, 27 J. Risk & Uncertainty 257 (2003). 
18 See Paul Slovic, The Perception of Risk (London: Earthscan, 2000). 
8 
inequitably distributed, man-made, or catastrophic.19 Diverse valuations of diverse risks 
should play a role in regulatory policy.  
For example, most of us are not greatly troubled by the cancer risks associated 
with x-rays, partly because they are voluntarily incurred. By contrast, the risks of 
terroris
le, regulators should take 
 
                                                
m and even pesticides and air pollution are more alarming because individuals 
cannot easily control them. And when a risk is faced by an identifiable community—as, 
for example, when landfills with toxic chemicals are located in largely poor areas—the 
public is especially likely to object to what it will perceive as unfairness.20 Ackerman and 
Heinzeling thus complain that CBA disregards important qualitative differences among 
quantitatively identical risks. It also tends to ignore, and often to reinforce, patterns of 
social inequality, above all because it pays no attention to a key question, which is 
distributional: Who receives the benefits and who incurs the costs? For both domestic and 
international environmental issues, Ackerman and Heinzerling emphasize the importance 
of fairness. If environmental threats mostly burden poor peop
that point into account, whatever the cost-benefit ratio.  
 Ackerman and Heinzerling are also concerned about how cost-benefit analysts 
value nature. How much will human beings pay to save an animal or a member of an 
endangered species? Economists have tried to answer the question by actually asking 
people. For example, one study find that the average American family is willing to pay 
$70 to protect the spotted owl, $6 to protect the striped shriner (an endangered fish), and 
as much as $115 per year to protect major parks against impairment of visibility from air 
pollution. Ackerman and Heinzerling ridicule these numbers, complaining that any 
precise monetary value fails to provide useful information. Bans on whaling, for 
example, are rooted in a widely shared ethical judgment, not on cost-benefit analysis. A 
democracy should base its decisions about the protection of nature on such ethical 
judgments, rather than by aggregating people’s willingness to pay. 
 
19 But see Howard Margolis, Dealing With Risk (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1999), for a 
challenge to this account of the lay/expert division in risk perceptions. 
20 Note, however, that the Not In My Backyard Syndrome – known in the trade as NIMBY – suggests that 
oped below, that people tend to become intuitive 
tal regulation are on-screen. 
many people will make self-serving judgments about the proper location of environmentally risky 
activities. This point is related to the suggestion, devel
cost-benefit analysts when both the benefits and the costs of environmen
9 
Ackerman and Heinzerling offer a final objection to cost-benefit analysis: the 
rights of future generations. I have noted that economists generally apply a discount rate 
to futu
ly bad, aggressive regulation is 
 particular regulatory 
sue. By contrast, Burgess explores the idea of “precaution” with close reference to a 
single controversy: the health risks associated with cellular phones. Burgess does not 
re gains and losses. With a 7 percent discount rate, $1000 in twenty years is worth 
only $260 today. Cost-benefit analysts within the federal government have long applied 
the usual discount rate for money (7 percent) to the benefits of safety and health 
regulation, so that prevention of 1000 fatal cancers in 2025 is equivalent to the prevention 
of 260 fatal cancers in 2005. Ackerman and Heinzerling respond that lives are not like 
money; they cannot be placed in a bank for the accumulation of interest. A discount rate 
of 7 percent radically shrinks the value of reductions in risk for those born, say, one 
hundred years from now. But current generations owe obligations to the future and 
should not discount measures that protect people not yet born. 
 Invoking the Precautionary Principle, Ackerman and Heinzerling argue that 
nations are obliged to take action against serious threats even before there is a scientific 
consensus. Above all, they want regulators to make regulatory decisions by attending to 
the worst-case scenario. If the worst case is extreme
desirable even if it might result in wasted money. When a nation spends too much on 
regulatory protection, it loses limited resources, which admittedly is undesirable; but 
waste is far better than catastrophe. Hence their “preference is to tilt toward 
overinvestment in protecting ourselves and our descendents” (p. 227). Ackerman and 
Heinzerling urge that this approach was taken in the context of the military spending of 
the Cold War, arguing that the nation rightly prepared for the high-risk case. They see 
protection against terrorism in similar terms. Ackerman and Heinzerling want to treat 
health and environmental risks in the same way.                                              
 
II. Pointless Precautions? 
 
Ackerman and Heinzerling do not focus in detail on any
is
explicitly discuss CBA, but he is highly skeptical of the Precautionary Principle, which, 
in his view, leads regulators to capitulate to baseless public fear. One of Burgess’ central 
claims is that public fears are often manufactured rather than found; for this reason, 
10 
Burges
oof than that. This term he 
mist reports 
grew in the media, suggesting that cell phones could produce illness and premature 
mortality (and also reduce sex drives). These reports helped to spur citizen action. By 
1999, l
s describes himself as a “social constructivist” (p. 11). But with respect to risk, 
Burgess is no constructivist at all. He believes that some risks are serious and that others 
are not, and that science is the best way to tell the difference.  
 Burgess contends that notwithstanding countless efforts, no reputable study has 
demonstrated significant health risks as a result of emissions from cell phones and cell 
phone towers.21 To date, much of the so-called evidence comes from anecdotes of the sort 
provided by anti-cell phone activist Debbie Collins, who contended that her daughter’s 
health had significantly improved after she was removed from a school near a cell phone 
tower. Rejecting expert opinion, Collins stated: “She’s a different child now—it’s all the 
proof I need to convince me there is a link between those wretched masts and the health 
of children” (p. 1). Another mother said, “I needed no more pr
started at a new school and I can already see the change in him. His memory has 
improved and his headaches have gone” (p. 2). Burgess is concerned that a precautionary 
approach, founded on statements of this kind, will both aggravate fear and impose costs 
for no good reason.  
Burgess’ tale begins with a media campaign. In the early1990s, a number of 
newspaper stories in the United Kingdom contended, on the basis of little evidence, that 
mobile phones and base stations were producing harmful health effects. Apparently 
influenced by these stories, the European Commission in Brussels began an official 
inquiry in 1995, ultimately funding future research and concluding that adverse effects 
could not be ruled out. Public fears intensified in 1996 after the issue received attention in 
a consumer health program on the BBC and a widely read news story in the Sunday 
Times featuring the headline, “Mobile phones cook your brain.” In 1997, alar
ocal political campaigns against cell phone towers became prominent, and they 
received favorable coverage in local and regional newspapers, which further energized 
public concern.  
                                                 
21 A different set of issues is raised by the risks associated with use of cell phones while driving. Here there 
is much stronger evidence of serious hazards. For an overview, see Robert Hahn and James Prieger, The 
Impact of Driver Cell Phone Use on Accidents (July 2004), available at http://www.aei-
brookings.org/publications/abstract.php?pid=806 
11 
These campaigns significantly affected both private and public institutions. The 
London Metropolitan police service told its officers to limit cell phones as a “purely 
precautionary measure” (p. 87). Harrods banned cell phones from its premises. Speaking 
in expl
concerns have been found in Australia, Italy, and South Africa. In 
Italy, th
scribing it as “alarm” (p. 259); and he mounts a broader attack on what 
he sees as the unhelpful belief that it is wrong to interfere with nature. He is therefore 
icitly precautionary terms, entrepreneur Richard Branson recommended the use of 
safety devices for his employees. Local governing councils across the United Kingdom 
attempted to ban or restrict mobile towers, particularly those near schools. At the national 
level, the Minister for Public Health legitimated public fears, insisting that in such a 
context, “it is very important that” officials “work very hard to keep ahead of public 
anxiety” (pp. 88-89). In Burgess’ account, precautionary responses by official institutions 
helped to fuel that very anxiety. Thus it “is only through being taken seriously by state 
bodies that the allegations about hypothetical risks have been able to command authority 
and acquire momentum beyond the immediate reactions of some individuals” (p. 222).  
Burgess also makes some interesting and somewhat puzzling remarks about cross-
cultural comparisons. In the United Kingdom, there was intense public focus on cell 
phone risks; similar 
e Environment Minister established a “green hotline” asking people to state their 
complaints about “abusive” siting of cell phone towers. The Australian government 
funded a large-scale research project on potential adverse health effects. But in the United 
States, the brief burst of concern in the early 1990s rapidly dissipated, to the point where 
it is hard to find any serious private or public concern about health risks. And in Finland, 
no discernible public fear has arisen at all, even though Finland has the highest 
percentage of cell phone users in the world. (The fact that Nokia is Finland’s biggest 
company is highly relevant here—a point, bearing on both precautions and CBA, to 
which I will return.) 
Burgess thinks that the cell phone controversy is merely one example of the 
misuse of precautionary thinking in domains in which scientific evidence fails to support 
people’s fears. For example, he challenges European skepticism about genetically 
modified food, de
troubled by a wide climate of sensitivity to small risks, especially those that are novel and 
12 
associa
it 
analysi
 
ted with technological innovation. Precautionary thinking, he believes, helps to 
create a culture of fear. 
 
III. Catastrophe, Costs, and Benefits 
 
 Judge Richard Posner is one of the founders of the economic analysis of law, and 
he should be expected to be enthusiastic about CBA. In Catastrophe: Risk and Response, 
he does not disappoint that expectation. What makes the book noteworthy is its focus on 
the application of CBA to truly catastrophic risks—those that might threaten the survival 
of the human race. Posner covers an extraordinarily wide range of hazards, including 
genetically modified crops, robotics, and nanotechnology, but he focuses in particular on 
four: asteroid collisions, particle-accelerator disasters, global warming, and bioterrorism. 
Posner believes that none of these risks can be dismissed, and he thinks that cost-benef
s should be applied to each of them. 
 Consider, for example, the dangers associated with very powerful particle 
accelerators. It is extremely unlikely, but not impossible, that such accelerators will 
produce a highly compressed object called a “strangelet,” which has the ability to convert 
whatever it encounters into a new form of matter. Posner quotes Sir Martin Rees, 
professor of physics at the University of Cambridge, who writes, “A hypothetical 
strangelet disaster could transform the entire plant Earth into an inert hyperdense sphere 
about one hundred meters across.”22 Posner accepts the widely held view that a strangelet 
disaster is exceedingly improbable, but he insists that it cannot be ruled out. As a result, 
he thinks that nations should at least be willing to ask whether the benefits of very 
powerful particle accelerators justify incurring the risk. On that question, he is quite 
doubtful. 
Posner’s discussion extends over a wide range. Because my topic is 
environmental protection, I shall focus on his treatment of global warming.23 Posner 
believes that the associated risks should be taken seriously, above all because of the 
possibility of truly catastrophic harm. He acknowledges that the leading economic expert 
                                                 
22See Martin Rees, Our Final Hour 120 (New York: Basic Books, 2003). 
23 For a general discussion, see Stephen Gardiner, Ethics and Global Climate Change, 114 Ethics 555 
(2004). 
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on global warming, William Nordhaus, estimates its total cost at $4 trillion24—a high 
figure, to be sure, but hardly astronomical, and one that allows cost-benefit analysis to get 
off the ground. (The United States has an annual GDP of $10 trillion, and as Posner 
oints out, $4 trillion represe
 even a runaway greenhouse effect, produced 
 mel
es an expected cost cannot be calculated.” In the terms of decision theory, 
p nts present value, which might be compared with the present 
economic value of the United States, which is roughly $100 trillion.) Nordhaus produces 
his $4 trillion figure essentially through the methods that Ackerman and Heinzerling 
deplore—using WTP and discounting the future.  
Posner is concerned not with the objections made by Ackerman and Heinzerling, 
which he implicitly rejects, but with the possibility that Nordhaus’ estimate greatly 
understates the problem, above all because of the dangers of abrupt warming, which 
would be especially destructive. Thus Posner thinks that existing models do not rule out 
the possibility of (for example) very rapid changes in both temperature and sea levels, the 
evolution and migration of deadly pests, and
by ting of tundras, thus releasing large quantities of additional greenhouse gases. One 
worst-case scenario is “snowball earth,” covering the world with a layer of ice several 
kilometers thick, a result of massive increases in cloud cover, preventing sunlight from 
reaching the earth. Sounding very much like Ackerman and Heinzerling, Posner seeks to 
draw attention to the worst that might happen. 
 Many scientists and economists, including Nordhaus, believe that global warming 
is not likely to create catastrophic harm, and that the real costs, human and economic, 
will be high but not intolerable. In their view, the worst-case scenarios can be responsibly 
described as improbable.25 Posner disagrees. He believes that “no probabilities can be 
attached to the catastrophic global-warming scenarios, and without an estimate of 
probabiliti
Posner contends that global warming presents a situation of uncertainty, where 
probabilities cannot be assigned to outcomes, rather than risk, where such probabilities 
can be assigned.26 In this way, global warming differs from other potentially catastrophic 
                                                 
24 See William Nordhaus and Joseph Boyer, Warming the World (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2000). 
25 See id. at 88, suggesting a 1.2% probability of a catastrophic impact with 2.5 C warming and of 6.8 
percent with 6 C warming. 
ghton Mifflin Co., 1933); Paul 
ives 129 (1991). Some people object that uncertainty does not exist, because it is always possible 
26 See Frank H. Knight, Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit (Boston: Hou
Davidson, Is Probability Theory Relevant for Uncertainty? A Post-Keynesian Perspective, 5(1) J. of Econ. 
Perspect
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risks that Posner explores, such as the strangelet disaster, which everyone characterizes as 
exceedingly unlikely. 
In general, Posner does not claim that responses to catastrophic risks should be 
chosen solely by reference to CBA. But he proposes that CBA “is an indispensable step 
in rational decision making in this as in other areas of government regulation. Effective 
responses to most catastrophic risks are likely to be extremely costly, and it would be 
mad to adopt such responses without an effort to estimate the costs and benefits.” While 
favorin
e notes that no effort has been made to 
oneti
“arbitrary,” though it is in line with several estimates by expert risk assessors. For 
                                                                                                           
g CBA, Posner rejects the Precautionary Principle because of its “sponginess.” He 
contends that once that principle becomes sensibly tempered, it turns into a form of CBA 
with risk aversion—that is, a form of CBA that creates a margin of safety to protect 
against those dangers that produce special concern. This understanding of the 
Precautionary Principle, he believes, is perfectly reasonable, but it turns the principle into 
a version of CBA, not a rival (as Ackerman and Heinzerling claim). 
Posner emphasizes that any effort to apply CBA to catastrophic risks requires a 
great deal of guesswork. Consider the proposal to build a new and very powerful particle 
accelerator, Brookhaven’s Relativistic Heavy Ion Collider. Posner is concerned about the 
remote possibility that the Brookhaven Collider will destroy the earth; he wants to 
evaluate the proposal by reference to CBA. H
m ze its benefits, but he ventures a “wild guess” that they amount to $250 million per 
year. (It is extremely hard to produce a figure, monetized or nonmonetized, to capture the 
benefits of basic research; for this reason Posner’s guess is indeed wild.) With that 
amount, the Collider would have a net present value of $400 million: $21.1 billion in 
benefits, assuming a 3% discount rate, over a projected ten-year span, minus the 
accelerator’s construction and operating costs, which are $1.1 billion. But what is the 
monetized value of the extinction risk? To answer that question, Posner needs to estimate 
both the probability of extinction and its monetized cost if it comes to fruition. For 
probability, he ventures a figure of 1 in ten million—a figure that he also deems 
                                      
for decisionmakers to produce probability assignments by proposing a series of lotteries over possible 
outcomes; but such assignments have no epistemic credentials if unrooted in either theory or repeated 
experiences, and some environmental problems, plausibly including global warming, are that sort of case. 
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monetized cost, based on WTP to reduce statistical risks27 and a 3% discount rate, he 
values the loss of the human race at $600 trillion. Doing the arithmetic, Posner believes 
that the
 time, and the Kyoto 
Protoco
 net benefits of the Brookhaven Collider are negative: –$100 million. Thus he 
concludes that the Collider should not be built. 
Posner acknowledges that “global warming is the poster child for the limitations 
of cost-benefit analysis” (p. 222). But even here, he thinks that it is possible to make 
progress by attempting to be as quantitative as possible. Most economists, armed with 
cost-benefit analysis, oppose the Kyoto Protocol, arguing that its monetized costs 
probably would exceed its monetized benefits. Recall that the monetized costs of global 
warming are estimated at around $4 trillion. For the world as a whole, the monetized 
benefits of the Kyoto Protocol are estimated at far less than those costs: only $108 
billion.28 The reason is that the protocol would do relatively little about the problem of 
global warming. Greenhouse gases stay in the atmosphere for a long
l would not, of course, affect those emissions that have already occurred. In 
addition, its provisions do not limit developing nations, primary sources of greenhouse 
gases, at all (a primary complaint of the Bush Administration); and for the industrialized 
world, it would merely stabilize emissions modestly below 1990 levels. Hence the 
benefits of the Kyoto Protocol would be modest, consisting as they would of a mere 
reduction in the increase of global warming emissions. At the same time, the Kyoto 
Protocol would impose significant costs on those subject to it, producing a total global 
cost ranging from $59 billion to $884 billion.29 The standard view is that the Kyoto 
Protocol fails CBA, because it is likely, in its implementation, to inflict costs in excess of 
the $108 billion gains. 
Posner thinks this analysis is badly incomplete, because it ignores the possibility 
that government regulation will force technological innovation, thus producing dramatic 
decreases in greenhouse gas emissions; and dramatic decreases are necessary to reduce 
the risk of catastrophe. Posner is particularly interested in the potentially desirable effects 
                                                 
27 To produce this number, Posner values an individual life at only $50,000, based on an assumption of a 
very low WTP for tiny risks. He emphasizes that this is a quite conservative assumption and that it would 
be reasonable to choose higher values. 
28 See Nordhaus and Boyer, supra note, at 167. 
29 Id. at 156. The low end of the range represents the cost with fully global emissions trading; the high end 
represents the cost without trading. If trading occurs within the nations listed in an annex to the protocol, 
the costs are estimated at $217 billion. 
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of significant taxes on carbon emissions. Such taxes would create economic incentives to 
develop clean fuels and better methods of carbon sequestration. Posner acknowledges 
that in view of existing uncertainty and the high costs of emissions controls, it is tempting 
simply to wait for more scientific information (as the Bush Administration has argued). 
One pr
oblem lies elsewhere. In many contexts, the 
oblem with this approach is that of irreversibility: Once greenhouse gases are in 
the atmosphere, they stay there for a long time. In a key passage, he argues that making 
“shallower cuts now can be thought of as purchasing an option to enable global warming 
to be stopped or slowed at some future time at a lower cost.”  
Posner does not offer a formal CBA for various approaches to the global warming 
problem. The reason is that his fundamental concern is abrupt warming, to which he 
believes that no probability can be assigned. In contrast to his quantitative analysis of 
particle accelerators, his analysis of global warming does not offer many numbers. 
Indeed, his own form of balancing does not have a transparent structure; his major 
argument involves the option analysis just described, with the suggestion that current cuts 
give us the flexibility to reduce warming in the future if that is what we choose to do. He 
thus argues in favor of aggressive emissions taxes on greenhouse gases, above all to 
reduce the possibility of catastrophic risk. 
 
IV. Problems with Precautions 
 
These three books cover three quite different issues: the idea of precaution; the 
translation of environmental harms into monetary equivalents; and the appropriate 
approach to environmental regulation in the face of scientific uncertainty. Let us explore 
these issues in turn.  
Ackerman and Heinzerling argue in favor of the Precautionary Principle. Burgess 
rejects it as leading to nonsensical outcomes. Posner believes that it must be converted 
into a form of CBA, one that embodies an aversion to those risks that deserve particular 
concern. At first glance, it is tempting to say, with Burgess, that the idea of precaution 
will lead to excessive controls on small or nonexistent risks. It is equally tempting to say, 
with Posner, that the idea is simply too vague to provide guidance; how much precaution 
is enough? But the most serious pr
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Precautionary Principle is incoherent.30 Risks are often on all sides of social situation, 
and risk reduction itself produce risks. Hence the Precautionary Principle, taken for all 
that it is worth, forbids the very measures that it requires. Ackerman and Heinzerling 
neglect the fact that regulation can create dangers of its own, in a way that suggests that 
along some dimensions, many precautions are not precautionary at all. Advocates of 
precaution often emphasize the costs associated with a product or process, without seeing 
that it may have benefit as well; and sometimes those benefits involve the environment 
itself. Why should regulators examine only one side of the ledger? 
 principle, is that substitutes for asbestos also 
arry risks. The problem is pervasive. The Precautionary Principle is often invoked as a 
ason for banning genetic m d that genetic modification 
creates
rinciple seems to give guidance, it is often because those who use it 
are foc
For example, regulation often gives rise to substitute risks, in the form of hazards 
that materialize, or are increased, as a result of regulation. Consider the case of DDT, 
often banned or regulated in the interest of reducing risks to birds and human beings. 
From the standpoint of the Precautionary Principle, the problem with such bans is that in 
poor nations, they eliminate what appears to be the most effective way of combating 
malaria—and thus significantly undermine public health.31 Or consider the United States 
Environmental Protection Agency’s effort to ban asbestos, a ban that, on health grounds, 
might well seem justified or even compelled by the Precautionary Principle. The 
difficulty, from the standpoint of that very
c
re odification of food, on the groun
 risks to human health and to the environment. The problem is that genetic 
modification of food also promises benefits to human health and the environment—and 
by eliminating those benefits, regulation itself threatens to run afoul of the Precautionary 
Principle. When the p
using on one aspect of risk-related situations and neglecting others. 
It is possible to go much further. A great deal of evidence suggests the possibility 
that an expensive regulation can have adverse effects on life and health.32 It has been 
                                                 
30 I develop this claim in some detail in Cass R. Sunstein, Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary 
Principle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2005). 
31 See Indur Goklany, The Precautionary Principle (Washington, DC: Cato, 2002). 
32Ralph Keeney, Mortality Risks Induced by Economic Expenditures, 10 Risk Anal. 147 (1990); Randall 
Lutter & John F. Morrall, III, Health-Health Analysis: A New Way to Evaluate Health and Safety 
Regulation, 8(1) J. Risk & Uncertainty 43, 49 table 1 (1994).  
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urged that a statistical life can be lost for every expenditure of $7 million33; one study 
suggests that an expenditure of $15 million produces a loss of life.34 Another suggests 
that poor people are especially vulnerable to this effect—that a regulation that reduces 
wealth for the poorest 20% of the population will have twice as large a mortality effect as 
a regulation that reduces wealth for the wealthiest 20%.35 If poor people are paying a 
significant amount for modest environmental benefits, their health might be made worse 
rather than better. To be sure, both the phenomenon and the underlying mechanisms are 
reasonably disputed (and Ackerman and Heinzerling reasonably dispute it).36 For 
purpos
Consider their 
es of applying the Precautionary Principle, the only point is that sensible people 
believe in that association. It follows that a multimillion dollar expenditure for 
“precaution” has -- as a worst case scenario -- significant adverse health effects, with an 
expenditure of $200 million possibly leading to perhaps as many as twenty or more lives 
lost.  
This point makes the Precautionary Principle hard to implement not merely where 
regulation introduces or increases substitute risks, but in any case in which the regulation 
costs a significant amount. If this is so, the Precautionary Principle, for that very reason, 
raises doubts about many regulations. If the principle argues against any action that 
carries a small risk of imposing significant harm, then we should be reluctant to spend a 
great deal of money to reduce risks, simply because those expenditures themselves carry 
risks. Here is the sense in which, the Precautionary Principle, taken for all that it is worth, 
is paralyzing: It stands as an obstacle to regulation and nonregulation, and to everything 
in between.37  
Ackerman and Heinzerling do not sufficiently appreciate this point. They neglect 
the possibility that expensive regulation will actually hurt real people. 
                                                 
33 See Keeney, supra note. 
34 See Robert W. Hahn et al., Do Federal Regulations Reduce Mortality? (Washington, D.C.: American 
Enterprise Institute, 2000). 
35 See Kenneth S. Chapman & Govind Hariharan, Do Poor People Have a Stronger Relationship Between 
Income and Mortality Than the Rich? Implications of Panel Data for Health-Health Analysis, 12 J. Risk & 
New Way to Evaluate Health and 
Uncertainty 51, 58-63 (1996). 
36See Randall Lutter & John F. Morrall, III, Health-Health Analysis: A 
Safety Regulation, 8 J. Risk & Uncertainty 43, 49 table 1 (1994). 
37 Posner’s distinctive concern involves catastrophic harms with a threat of extinction; here, of course, no 
equally serious risk is likely to be on the other side. I return to this point in the discussion of maximin 
below. 
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seemingly offhand remark about protection against workplace hazards: The “costs of the 
regulation would probably be borne by the employers who would be required to maintain 
safer workplaces” (p. 193). But the costs of regulation are often borne not only by 
“employers,” but also by consumers, whose prices increase, and by workers, who might 
find fewer and less remunerative jobs. When government imposes large costs on 
“polluters,” consumers and workers are likely to pay part of the bill. And if prices 
increase, some risks will increase as well. To be sure, some environmental regulations do 
increase employment and decrease prices. But as a general rule, there is no reason to 
believe that regulatory imposition of high costs will benefit workers and consumers; the 
opposite is more likely to be true. 
In the context of cell phones, this point helps illuminates a quite remarkable fact, 
one to which Burgess gives too little attention: Notwithstanding the popularity of 
precautionary thinking, and the apparent intensity of public fears, those fears did not, in 
fact, p
xample, the likely public reaction to a current suggestion by an American 
politici
of evidence that the harm is real. In short, the very idea of precaution loses some of its 
 aware that precaution imposes costs and even risks of its own.38 
roduce large-scale controls on either phones or towers. Burgess offers no 
explanation of why such controls did not materialize, but his brief discussion of Finland 
provides a useful clue. Is it really a paradox, or an irony, that fears of cell phones were 
especially weak in a nation that has the largest percentage of cell phone users in the 
world? I do not believe so. The Finnish economy is heavily dependent on Nokia and thus 
the cell phone industry; people in Finland do not want the Finnish economy to collapse. 
And if most citizens depend on cell phones, they are far less likely to accept 
sensationalistic claims of risk, simply because they have so much to lose from regulation. 
(Imagine, for e
an that cell phones should be banned because they pose a cancer risk.) If the 
benefits of cell phone use are evident to all or most, then people will demand a great deal 
appeal when people are
When people are aware of that fact, some kind of balancing, involving both costs and 
benefits, is likely to emerge. 
                                                 
38 See the treatment of fungibility in Howard Margolis, Dealing with Risk (Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press, 1999). 
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In a brief but illuminating discussion of another environmental issue, Burgess 
strongly supports the general point. He refers to a mining town in Colorado whose 
citizens were deemed, by the Environmental Protection Agency, to be at risk from toxic 
contamination. The town’s citizens, already suffering from serious economic decline, 
responded not with fear, and much less with enthusiasm for a precautionary approach, but 
by demonizing the EPA, which it regarded as “the devil incarnate. Grimly they recounted 
how government bureaucrats had invaded their town uninvited, threatening residents with 
the prospect of condemned property, involuntary relocation, and unwelcome new legal 
requirements. . . . And all, they claimed, over a hazard ‘that doesn’t exist.’” (p. 272). Far 
from succumbing to panic, citizens of the mining town were well aware of how much 
they ha
f risks into monetary equivalents. Recall that under current 
practice, the monetary values come mostly from involves real-world markets, producing 
evidence of compensation levels for actual risks. It is important to see that in basing cost-
d to lose from aggressive regulation; hence they sought to dismiss real evidence of 
harm. Precautions and precautionary thinking seem far less attractive when people 
believe that precautions would produce significant costs and risks. 
Burgess does not draw attention to one of the remarkable lessons of his story, 
which is that the cell phone scare did not produce aggressive regulation not only because 
the evidence of harm was weak, but also and still more fundamentally because a growing 
number of people use cell phones and would be inconvenienced, or far worse, by such 
measures. (Consider the fact that cell phones are often used to obtain help in emergency 
situations.) In the context of genetically modified food, by contrast, the costs of 
regulation are not highly visible, at least not to Europeans. Precautionary thinking, in 
short, is most appealing when the costs and burdens of precautions are not visible. When 
both costs and benefits are on the public viewscreen, people become intuitive cost-benefit 
analysts, and they tend to be cautious about precautions—unless the evidence in their 
favor is strong. This point brings us directly to the questions raised by CBA. 
 
V. Costs and Benefits 
 
As Ackerman and Heinzerling stress, some of the most difficult questions for 
CBA involve the translation o
benefit analysis on calculations of this kind, regulators are not, in fact, producing a “value 
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of a sta
ent strands in liberal 
theory.
At first glance, use of WTP, u hy 
should people be forced to pay an amount TP? Of 
course 
tistical life.” In fact they are not “valuing life” at all. They are not saying that the 
average American would pay $6 million to avoid death, or that a human life is, in some 
metaphysical sense, worth that amount. Instead they are generating numbers that reflect 
the market value of statistical risks. Typically agencies are dealing with low-level risks, 
on the order of 1/100,000, and when they “value a life” at $6 million, they are really 
saying that the evidence suggests that people must be paid $60 to be subject to a risk of 
that magnitude—and that government will build on that evidence in making regulatory 
decisions. 
A. The Argument for WTP 
 
Ackerman and Heinzerling think that this practice is a form of madness, and 
hence they do not pause to ask why regulators in a democratic society might care about 
market valuations of statistical risks. But there are two possible answers, both connected 
with individual choice, and both growing directly out of promin
 The first involves welfare; the second involves autonomy.  
To clarify the point, assume a society in which people face multiple risks of 
1/100,000, and in which every person is both adequately informed and willing to pay no 
more and no less than $60 to eliminate each of those risks. Assume too that the cost of 
eliminating these 1/100,000 risks is widely variable, ranging from close to zero to 
hundreds of millions of dollars. Assume finally that the cost of eliminating any risk is 
borne entirely by those who benefit from risk elimination. Under that assumption, 
regulation imposes the equivalent of user’s fee; for example, people’s water bills will 
entirely reflect the costs of a policy that eliminates a 1/100,000 of getting cancer from 
arsenic in drinking water. If the per-person cost is $100, each water bill will be increased 
by exactly that amount.  
nder the stated assumptions, is easy to defend. W
 for regulation that exceeds their W
we might believe that a measure of redistribution is appropriate—that private 
sources, or government, should provide people with regulatory protection for free. But 
regulation need not, and often does not, amount to a subsidy to those who benefit from it. 
After the enactment of workers’ compensation regulation, nonunionized workers faced a 
dollar-for-dollar wage reduction, corresponding almost perfectly to the expected value of 
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the benefits they received.39 For drinking water regulation, something similar is involved. 
The cost of regulations is passed onto consumers in the form of higher water bills.40  
More particularly, those who are interested in welfare will insist on the relevance 
of WTP under the stated assumptions.41 If people are willing to pay $60, but no more, to 
eliminate a risk of 1/100,000, then we have good reason to think that their welfare is 
increased by asking them to pay that amount—and that their welfare is decreased by 
asking them to pay more. There are many demands on people’s budgets, and if they 
refuse to spend more than $60 on a 1/100,000 risk, it may because they would like to use 
their money for food, shelter, r number of other goods. 
egula
rm of coercion, is not 
to requ
d resources (again so long as those choices are adequately 
informe
ecreation, education, or any 
R tion can operate as a forced exchange , and by hypothesis, a forced exchange on 
terms that people dislike will make them worse off.42  
For purposes of evaluating regulation, it does not matter if the existing 
distribution of income is unjust or if poor people are, in an intelligible sense, coerced to 
run certain risks. The remedy for unjust distributions, and for that fo
ire people to buy regulatory benefits on terms that they find unacceptable. Suppose 
that people are willing to pay only $60 to eliminate a 1/100,000 risk because they are not 
rich, and that if they had double their current wealth, they would be willing to pay $120. 
Even if this is so, government does people no favors by forcing them to pay the amount 
that they would pay if they had more money. In ridiculing WTP, Ackerman and 
Heinzerling devote too little attention to this point.  
If we reject the argument from welfare, we might nonetheless rely on willingness 
to pay on grounds of personal autonomy.43 On this view, people should be sovereign over 
their own lives, and this principle means that government should respect personal choices 
about how to use limite
d). When people decline to devote more than $60 to eliminate a 1/100,000 risk, it 
                                                 
39 Price Fishback and Shawn Everett Kantor, A Prelude to the Welfare State (Chicago: University of 
Chicago Press, 1998). 
40 See Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, in Risk and Reason, supra note.  
41 See Gibbard, supra note, at 97, for a valuable discussion of how cost-benefit analysis might be taken as 
“a  rough surrogate for expected total intrinsic-reward maximization.” To the same general effect, 
defending CBA on welfare grounds, see Matthew Adler and Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit 
Analysis When Preferences Are Distorted, 29 J. Legal Stud. 1105 (2000); Matthew Adler and Eric A. 
Posner, Rethinking Cost-Benefit Analysis, 109 Yale L.J. 167 (1999). 
42 As we shall see, it matters a great deal whether it actually so operates; I explore this issue in detail below. 
43 See Ronald Dworkin, Sovereign Virtue (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002). 
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is because they would prefer to spend the money in a way that seems to them more 
desirable. If regulators reject people’s actual judgments, then they are insulting their 
dignity
ey against decreases in statistical 
risks. I
kes sense to say that the government 
is requ
added that people have a right not to be subjected to the intentional or 
. The use of willingness to pay therefore can claim a simultaneous defense from 
both utilitarian and deontological accounts. 
 When the assumptions just outlined are met, we have what might be described as 
easy cases for the use of the WTP criterion. Some people contend that money and health 
are incommensurable—that our reflective judgments do not permit us to line up dollars 
and risks along a single metric.44 Suppose that this is so. To see the easy cases as such, it 
is not necessary to make controversial arguments about commensurability or to venture 
into controversial philosophical territory. The underlying claim is a simple pragmatic 
one, to the effect that people are willing to trade mon
f people actually make those trades, then government might well build on their 
practices in designing policies. 
B. Objections 
 
There are several possible objections. Perhaps the most obvious would point to 
people’s rights. On one view, people have a right not to be subjected to risks of a certain 
magnitude, and the use of WTP will violate that right. In fact it is fully reasonable to say 
that whatever their WTP, human beings have a right not to be subject to risks above a 
particular level. Imagine, for example, that poor people live in a place where they face a 
1/20 annual risk of dying from water pollution; it ma
ired to reduce that risk even if people are willing to pay only $1 to eliminate it and 
the per-person cost is $5. The only qualification is that in practice, rights are resource-
dependent. What rights people are able to claim, against their government, is a product of 
the amount of available money, and hence people’s legitimate arguments for protection 
are inevitably affected by the level of resources in the society. But let us simply assume 
here that risks above a certain level should count as violative of rights.  
It might be 
reckless imposition of harm, whatever their WTP. If a company subjects the citizens of a 
town to a high danger, and it does so maliciously or without the slightest concern for their 
                                                 
44 See Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and in Economics (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 
1994). 
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welfare, the rights of those citizens have been violated, even if their WTP is low. Indeed, 
some such systems impose strict liability for harms. Well-functioning legal systems make 
wrongdoers pay for the injuries they inflict.  
As abstract claims about people’s rights, these objections are entirely plausible. 
Someth
 of statistically small risks. Even if rights are involved 
when people are subject to small risks, p  permitted to waive those rights 
at an ag
requiring them to 
pay for
                                                
ing has gone badly wrong if people are exposed to serious risks and if their low 
WTP prevents them from doing anything in response. Things are even worse if 
government uses their low WTP to justify inaction in the face of those risks. It would be 
ludicrous to suggest that WTP is determinative of the appropriate use of government 
subsidies; a redistributive policy hardly tracks people’s WTP. (Would it make sense to 
say that government will give poor people a check for $100 only if they are willing to pay 
$100 for that check?)  
In many cases of environmental regulation, however, rights violations are not 
involved; we are speaking here
eople should be
reeable price (at least on the assumptions that I am making). The proper response 
to an apparent rights violation is not to force people to buy protection that they do not 
want, but to provide a subsidy that will give them the benefit for free or enable them to 
receive the benefit at what is, for them, an acceptable price. But regulation—and this is 
the key point—often does not such thing; and for the easy cases, the question is one of 
regulation under the stated assumptions. So long as that is the question, use of WTP does 
not violate anyone’s rights. 
What about environmental wrongdoers? If a company has intentionally, 
recklessly, or even negligently exposed people to harm, it should be held accountable 
through the payment of damages, even if the WTP of the affected population is low. It is 
possible for the tort system to go much further. A sensible legal system might well 
choose to force companies to internalize the costs of their activities by 
 the harms they have caused, even if there has been neither intentional nor reckless 
wrongdoing. Within tort theory, there is an active debate on this question, and it is 
possible to support strict liability by reference to a range of theoretical positions.45 But 
 
ic Analysis of Law 175-82 (New York: Aspen Publishers, 4th ed., 1992). 
45 See Richard A. Epstein, A Theory of Strict Liability, 2 J. Legal Stud. 151 (1973); Richard Posner, 
Econom
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the subject here is regulation, not compensation via the tort system. It would be odd to 
say that people have a right to be required to pay more for risk reduction than they are 
willing to pay, at least if they are adequately informed. If people are willing to pay only 
$25 to 
or some decisions, this approach is badly misconceived. The 
Americ
dangered species chosen on the basis of aggregated WTP. 
Whethe
                                                
eliminate a risk of 1/100,000, a reference to their “rights” cannot plausibly justify 
the conclusion that government should impose a regulation that costs them $75. 
An independent objection would stress, as Ackerman and Heinzerling do, that 
people are citizens, not merely consumers. On this view, regulatory choices should be 
made not after aggregating WTP, but after citizens have deliberated with one another 
about their preferences and values. The argument against forced exchanges treats people 
as consumers; it sees their decisions about safety as the same as their decisions about all 
other commodities. F
an constitutional system is a deliberative democracy,46 not a maximization 
machine, and many social judgments should be made by citizens engaged in deliberative 
discussion with one another rather than by aggregating the individual choices of 
consumers.  
In the context of racial and sex discrimination, for example, sensible societies do 
not aggregate people’s WTP. The level of permissible discrimination is not set by using 
market evidence to see how much people would be willing to pay to discriminate (or to 
be free from discrimination). Even if discriminators would be willing to pay a great deal 
to avoid associating with members of unpopular groups, such discrimination is banned. 
Nor is the protection of en
r and when to protect members of endangered species is a moral question to be 
resolved through democratic discussion, not through exercises in consumer sovereignty. 
In many environmental contexts, use of WTP would wrongly see people as consumers, 
purchasing products, rather than as citizens, deliberating about values. Speaking in this 
vein, Amartya Sen emphasizes that “discussions and exchange, and even political 
arguments, contribute to the formation and revision of values.”47 He urges that in the 
particular context of environmental protection, solutions require us “to go beyond looking 
 
ss, 2001). 
46 See William Bessette, The Mild Voice of Reason (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1992). 
47 Amartya Sen, Rationality and Freedom 287 (Cambridge: Harvard University Pre
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only for the best reflection of existing individual preferences, or the most acceptable 
procedures for choices based on those preferences.”48
Sen’s claims identify some serious limitations on the use of WTP. But such 
objections should not be read for more than they are worth. In trading off safety and 
health in our own private lives, we do not have static values and preferences. Much of the 
time, o
is indeed important to go beyond “the best reflection of existing individual 
prefere
people’s WTP reflects an effort to reduce cognitive dissonance through the conclusion 
                                                
ur choices are a product of reflection, even if we are simply acting as consumers. 
To be sure, moral questions are not to be resolved by aggregating private willingness to 
pay. Some preferences, even though backed by WTP, are morally off-limits, and policy 
should not take account of them. In addition, many people are unwilling to pay a great 
deal for goods that have strong moral justifications; animal welfare is an example. In 
these circumstances, the market model is inapplicable and WTP tells us very little.  
But what about the easy cases? Do these arguments suggest that government 
should override individual choices about how much to spend to eliminate low-level risks, 
even when those choices are adequately informed? For environmental protection 
generally, it 
nces.” But this point does not establish that people should be required to pay (for 
example) $100 to eliminate mortality risks of 1/100,000 when they are willing to pay 
only $75. If people’s WTP reflects impulsiveness, recklessness, an absence of 
information, or insufficient deliberation, then it is important for other people, in 
government as elsewhere, to draw their attention to that fact. And in some cases, a low 
WTP might be overridden on the ground that it is rooted in errors, factual or otherwise. 
But these points should not be taken as a general objection to my conclusion about the 
easy cases, and to suggest that government should force people to reduce statistical risks 
at an expense that they deem excessive.  
A final objection would emphasize the possibility that people’s preferences have 
adapted to limitations in existing opportunities, including deprivation.49 Perhaps people 
show a low WTP for environmental goods, including health improvements, simply 
because they have adjusted to environmental bads, including health risks. Perhaps 
 
48 Id. at 289. 
ssbaum, 49 See Jon Elster, Sour Grapes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1983);  Martha Nu
Women and Human Development (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001).  
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that risks are lower than they actually are.50 To generalize the objection, perhaps people 
suffer from a problem of “miswanting”51; they want things that do not promote their 
welfare
pt. If 
govern
more complicated. In the context of air pollution 
regulat
, and they do not want things that would promote their welfare. If this is so, then 
WTP loses much of its underlying justification; people’s decisions do not actually 
promote their welfare,52 and their autonomy, properly understood, may not require 
respect for their decisions, which may be nonautonomous. In other words, the idea of 
autonomy requires not merely respect for whatever preferences people happen to have, 
but also social conditions that allow preferences to be developed in a way that does not 
reflect coercion or injustice. With respect to some risks, the relevant preferences are 
nonautonomous; consider the fact that many women face a risk of male violence under 
circumstances in which they believe that little can be done and hence ada
ment can be confident that people are not willing to pay for goods from which 
they would greatly benefit, government should probably abandon WTP.  
In the context of ordinary regulatory policy, however, this objection has more 
theoretical than practical interest. Typically we are speaking of steps that would reduce 
low-level mortality risks (say, 1/50,000). Much of the time, there is no reason to believe 
that the use of informed WTP (say, $100) is a product of adaptive preferences. When 
there is such a reason, the judgment about the easy cases must be revised. 
 
C. Harder Cases 
 
There is an obvious artificiality in the assumptions behind the easy cases. Most 
important, people do not always bear the full social costs of the regulatory benefits they 
receive. Sometimes they pay only a fraction of those costs—or possibly even nothing at 
all. When this is so, the analysis is much 
ion, for example, there is a complex set of distributional effects, and on balance, 
                                                 
50 See George A. Akerlof, An Economic Theorist’s Book of Tales 123-37 (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press 1984). 
51 Daniel T. Gilbert & T.D. Wilson, Miswanting, in Thinking and Feeling:  The Role of Affect in Social 
Cognition 178 (Joseph P. Forgas ed., 2000); Timothy D. Wilson & Daniel T. Gilbert, Affective 
dvances in Experimental Social Psychology, June 2003, at 345. Forecasting, A
52 For general discussion, see Daniel Kahneman, A Psychological Perspective on Economics, 93 Am. Econ. 
Rev. (Papers & Proc.) 162 (2003); Daniel Kahneman et al., Back to Bentham?  Explorations of 
Experienced Utility, 112 Q.J. Econ. 375, 379–80 (1997). 
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poor people, and members of minority communities, appear to be net gainers.53 A CBA, 
based on WTP, might not produce an adequate account of the welfare effects of air 
pollution regulation.54 And even if it does, an account of welfare effects would not end 
the normative question, because the distributional gains are important to consider. 
Suppose, for example, that beneficiaries of a proposed drinking water regulation 
are willing to pay only $80 to eliminate a risk of 1/50,000 in drinking water; that the per-
person cost of eliminating a 1/50,000 risk is $100; but that for every dollar of that cost, 
the beneficiaries pay only 70 cents. The remaining 30 cents might be paid by water 
companies themselves, in the form of reduced profits, or by employees of the water 
companies, in the form of reduced wages and fewer jobs. In this example, the costs of the 
regulation exceed the benefits; it is inefficient. But by hypothesis, the regulation makes 
its beneficiaries of the regulation better off. If CBA provides the rule of decision, and if 
the WTP criterion is used, the fact that the monetized costs exceed the monetized benefits 
is decis
 if the benefits 
exceed the costs. When using the WTP numbers, government is acting as a maximization 
mac ine, aggregating all benefits and by the WTP criterion. But this is 
an imp
asks whether in principle, the winners could compensate the losers, and a surplus could 
ive. But as a normative matter, the analysis here is far harder than in the easy 
cases. On what assumption should the WTP numbers be decisive?   
The assumption must be that economic efficiency is the goal of government, at 
least in the context of environmental regulation—that in order to know what to do, we 
should aggregate the benefits and costs of regulation, and act if and only
h  costs as measured 
lausible understanding of what government should be doing. In fact it represents a 
shift from the relatively uncontroversial Pareto criterion, exemplified in the easy cases, to 
a version of the far more controversial Kaldor-Hicks criterion,55 which assesses policy by 
asking this question: Are the gainers winning more than the losers are losing? The 
Kaldor-Hicks criterion is sometimes described as potential Pareto superiority, because it 
                                                 
53 See Matthew E. Kahn, The Beneficiaries of Clean Air Act Regulation, 24 Regulation 34 (2001). 
54 On the relationship between welfare and cost-benefit analysis, see Gibbard, supra note; Adler and Posner, 
supra note. 
55 It is only a version of that criterion, because it is measuring welfare in monetary equivalents. A direct 
assessment of welfare, if it were possible, might show that the regulation in question is justified on Kaldor-
Hicks grounds. 
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be left over. The difficulty of course is that Pareto superiority is merely potential. Some 
people really are losing and others are gaining.  
In the harder cases, the gainers are gaining less (in monetary terms) than the 
losers are losing -- and hence CBA suggests that regulation is unjustified. Under the 
assump
cases in which the beneficiaries of regulation pay all or most of its cost. In such cases, 
WTP is reasonably used so long as people are adequately informed and so long as the 
tions I have given, the regulation is indeed inefficient: Its social cost is higher 
than its social benefit. But is the regulation undesirable? This is not at all clear. The first 
problem is that WTP is measuring gains and loses in monetary terms, rather than in 
welfare terms. It is possible that those who gain, in the harder cases, are gaining more 
welfare than the losers lose; WTP is not dispositive on that question.56 The second 
problem is distributional. Suppose that in terms of overall welfare, the regulation is not 
desirable; it makes aggregate welfare lower rather than higher. But suppose too that those 
who benefit are poorer and more disadvantaged than those who lose. If, for example, 
those who are willing to pay $80 are disproportionately poor, and those who pay the 
remainder are disproportionately wealthy, the regulation might be plausibly justified 
despite the welfare loss.  
It is natural to respond here that if redistribution is what is sought, then it should 
be produced not through regulation but through the tax system, which is a more efficient 
way of transferring resources to those who need help.57 But suppose that redistribution is 
not going to happen through the tax system. If so, then the regulation in the harder cases 
cannot be ruled off-limits despite its inefficiency. The fact that a regulation is helpful to 
the most disadvantaged is not decisive in its favor. If it is trivially helpful, and if it inflicts 
huge costs on everyone else, little can be said for it. But everything depends on the 
magnitude of the relevant effects. A program that produces large gains for the least well-
off would seem to be justified even if it imposes, in terms of WTP, slightly higher costs 
than benefits on balance. 
The simple conclusion is that the argument for using WTP is most plausible in 
                                                 
56 On CBA and welfare, and for a welfarist defense of CBA as a decision procedure, see Adler and Posner, 
supra note. 
57 See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & Steven Shavell, Why the Legal System is Less Efficient Than the Income Tax 
in Redistributing Income, 23 J. Legal Stud. 667, 667 (1994). 
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question is how much they should be forced to spend to avoid existing risks. The analysis 
must be different when the beneficiaries of regulation are paying only a small fraction of 
its cost
 of death from cancer might well be worse than a statistically 
equiva
 of risks, and which (as Ackerman and Heinzerling say) cannot 
plausib
s. In such cases, it is possible that the regulation can be justified as a redistributive 
measure or on welfare grounds. To know whether it can be so justified, it is necessary to 
go beyond CBA and to identify the winners and losers.58 Ackerman and Heinzerling 
neglect to distinguish between the easy cases and the harder ones, and thus fail to 
appreciate the arguments that lie behind use of WTP.  
 
D. On Individuation and Discount Rates 
 
 Many of the most interesting arguments offered by Ackerman and Heinzerling are 
best seen as attacks on CBA as currently practiced, not on CBA as such. Consider, for 
example, their suggestion that it is foolish to extrapolate, from workplace studies, a single 
figure for the value of statistical risks. Ackerman and Heinzerling note that people care 
not only about the magnitude of the risk (is it 1/10,000 or 1/100,000?) but also about its 
nature and context. A risk
lent risk of a sudden, unanticipated death. A risk of death from air pollution, or 
drinking water, might well produce a higher WTP than a statistically equivalent risk of 
death from a workplace accident. 
 This claim is plausible, but it is most sensibly taken as an argument for a more 
refined version of CBA, one that insists on variations among statistically equivalent 
risks.59 A single number is genuinely obtuse; in fact it is inconsistent with the very theory 
that gives rise to the use of WTP in the first place. Recall that if WTP is relevant, it is 
because its use promotes welfare, autonomy, or both. If this is so, regulators should 
consult actual WTP, which varies across risks, rather than a single or unitary WTP, which 
grows only out of one set
ly be applied to every risk of a given statistical magnitude. The real question is not 
whether to have more differentiated monetary values for qualitatively identical risks, but 
                                                 
58 A possible defense of CBA would be that individualized identification of winners and losers would be 
extremely difficult, that agencies would not make defensible distributional judgments, and that CBA works 
better, on balance, that any approach that attempts to make finer distinctions. A great deal of empirical 
work would be necessary to make this defense convincing. My goal here is to sort out the theoretical issues; 
CBA might look especially good, or especially bad, when we investigate empirical issues as well. 
59 I develop this point in Sunstein, Laws of Fear, supra note. 
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where to find reliable evidence on which to base those values. Economists are starting to 
fill the relevant gaps, in a way that supports the suggestion that a single WTP is far too 
crude.60 It would not be difficult to continue to use WTP, but to take account of the fact 
that it varies across risks, even if they are statistically identical. 
Ackerman and Heinzerling also object, plausibly, to the application of the 
standard discount rate for money to the valuation of future gains in terms of both 
mortality and morbidity.61 But suppose that no discount rate is appropriate -- that deaths 
in 2050 should be valued the same way as deaths in 2010. If so, the analysis of costs and 
enefits would not be the ate both costs and 
etimes environmental regulation protects members of 
ture 
b same; but it would remain possible to calcul
benefits. In any case the analysis of discounting must make a distinction to which 
Ackerman and Heinzerling devote insufficient attention.62 Sometimes environmental 
regulation protects living people from latent harms -- risks that will come to fruition not 
now, but ten, twenty, or thirty years from now. It seems clear that some discount rate 
should be applied to latent harms. Most people, intuitively and on reflection, would much 
prefer to face a harm in the future rather than immediately.63 Hence some kind of 
discount rate makes a great deal of sense for harms that will not come to fruition for a 
long time (even if the discount rate for such harms does not turn out to be the same as the 
discount rate for money). But som
fu generations; and this is a quite different problem. If a program would save one 
hundred people born in 2020, it is not clear that it deserves less enthusiasm than a 
program that would save one hundred people born in 2002.  
On the other hand, a refusal to use a discount rate creates a number of logical and 
practical conundrums, especially if it would impose high costs on current generations—a 
particular problem in light of the fact that if current generations face high costs, posterity 
                                                 
60 See id. 
61 See Tyler Cowen & Derek Parfit, Against the Social Discount Rate, in Justice Between Age Groups and 
Generations 144-45 (Peter Laslett & James S. Fishkin eds.) (New Haven: Yale University Press,1992). 
62 See the illuminating discussion in Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, 
and the Discounting of Human Lives, 99 Colum. L. Rev. 941, 962–74 (1999). 
llness in 
63 It is difficult to separate, in practice, the fact that people would prefer more life-years rather than fewer 
from the fact that people would prefer a distant death rather than an immediate one. If most people would 
much prefer a fatal illness in 2050 to a fatal illness in 2010, there may be no discounting; the choice might 
be based on the fact that the later date ensure more life-years. The question of morbidity present a simpler 
test of discounting: Most people would rather have a month of illness in 2010 than a month of i
2005. 
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is likely to be hurt too. Hence aggressive regulation, at least if it is extremely costly, may 
not help future generations at all. It has also been argued that if regulators are indifferent 
as between lives saved now and lives saved in the future, but discount costs at some 
positive rate, then it makes sense for them to delay life-saving expenditures indefinitely.64 
In any
article accelerators contains 
what h
                                                
 case it has been suggested that instead of discounting lives, regulators might 
simply use the future discounted (monetary) cost of saving lives at the time when lives 
are saved—an approach that is mathematically identical and hence produces the same 
analysis.65
I cannot resolve here the complex questions raised by individuation of WTP and 
by discount rates.66 Ackerman and Heinzerling are right to raise questions about existing 
practice.67 It seems clear that greater individuation is justified for statistically equivalent 
risks that people consider different to be qualitatively different; it also seems clear that a 
discount rate should be used for latent harms. The appropriate approach to risks faced by 
future generations remains unsettled. The simplest point is that if these questions are 
properly answered, CBA will be mended, not ended. 
 
VI. Uncertainty, Catastrophe, and Maximin 
 
 Thus far I have emphasized issues of monetization, as highlighted by Ackerman 
and Heinzerling. But as Posner’s discussion demonstrates, some of the most interesting 
problems raised by CBA have nothing to do with the translation of risks into monetary 
equivalents. Recall that Posner’s assessment of the risks of p
e himself describes as arbitrariness. Nor is the problem limited to unconventional 
problems of this kind. Consider a fairly mundane issue under the Safe Drinking Water 
Act: If government reduces permissible levels of arsenic in drinking water from 50 parts 
 
64 Emmett B. Keeler and Shan Cretin, Discounting of Life-Saving and Other Nonmonetary Effects, 29 
nt Science 300 (1983). Ackerman and Heinzerling discuss this claim and reject it (pp. 193-94), 
ally 
hnological advances, future 
 and Death, U Chi L Rev. (forthcoming 2005). 
Manageme
in part on the ground that allowing numerous current deaths would be politically unacceptable; but the 
claim is one of the logical implication of refusing to discount, and the fact that it entails a politic
unacceptable outcome does not mean that it is wrong.  
65 See Morrall, supra note. Note that many people believe that because of tec
risks are unlikely to come to fruition, simply because new technologies will permit us to prevent them. This 
is not, however, a point about discounting itself. 
66 An especially good discussion is Revesz, supra note. 
67 They are also right to contend that regulators should consider not only the WTP of those who face 
mortality risks, but also that of others who care about them. See Eric A. Posner and Cass R. Sunstein, 
Dollars
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per billion (ppb) to 10 ppb, what, exactly, are the expected benefits? On the basis of 
existing evidence, many answers are scientifically respectable.68 For a regulation 
mandating that reduction, the EPA estimated that it would prevent about twenty-five 
premature deaths and roughly an equivalent number of nonfatal cancer cases. But on the 
basis of the same inconclusive evidence that was before the EPA, it would have been 
reasonable to project that the regulation would prevent as few as six deaths or as many as 
110. The evidence suggested a range, not a specific estimate. 
 As a result, critics of CBA might contend the method gives only the illusion of 
precisio
 range. Such an analysis would not 
resolve the question of what to do, but it would greatly discipline the inquiry. 
In some circ  regulators in a far 
ore d
under such conditions, they might well do best to follow maximin, identifying the worst-
is present, but in the regulatory context, it 
n. Even before deaths are translated into monetary equivalents, regulators might 
well be required to make judgments of value, not merely fact, in projecting the likely 
effects of regulatory protection. But this point should not be read for more than it is 
worth. When specific estimates are not feasible, the evidence often permits agencies to 
specify a range. For the arsenic rule, they could say, for example, that a 10 ppb standard 
is likely to prevent a minimum of six and a maximum of 110 deaths, and they might 
undertake cost-benefit analysis with reference to the
umstances, however, existing information puts
m ifficult situation. These are cases of genuine uncertainty, in which probabilities 
cannot be assigned to the expected outcomes. Posner is much concerned with these 
situations. While he does not spell out the argument, his treatment of catastrophic risks 
points to a promising possibility for a narrower, and more appealing, version of the 
Precautionary Principle, a kind of Anti-Catastrophe Principle. Suppose that citizens face 
catastrophic risks to which probabilities cannot be assigned; suppose, that is, that they are 
operating under conditions of uncertainty rather than risk. If regulators are operating 
case scenarios and choosing the approach that eliminates the worst of these. It follows 
that if aggressive measures are justified to reduce the risks associated with global 
arming, one reason is that those risks are pow tentially catastrophic and existing science 
does not enable us to assign probabilities to the worst-case scenarios. Maximin is an 
appealing decision rule whenever uncertainty 
                                                 
68 See Sunstein, supra note. 
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is particularly important for extremely bad outcomes. When Ackerman and Heinzerling 
suggest the value of focusing on the worst case, they are offering bad advice under 
circumstances of risk; but if they are understood to be speaking of uncertainty, they are 
on much firmer ground (see pp. 225–26). 
In an illuminating effort to recast the Precautionary Principle,69 Stephen Gardiner 
adapts John Rawls’s argument that when “grave risks” are involved, and when 
probabilities cannot be assigned to the occurrence of those risks, maximin is the 
uld not be 
followe
appropriate decision rule, at least if the chooser “cares very little, if anything, for what he 
might gain among the minimum stipend that he can, in fact, be sure of by following the 
maximin rule.”70 Applying Rawls’ claims about the original position and distributive 
justice to the environmental setting, Gardiner urges that maximin, and hence a “core” 
Precautionary Principle, is justified (1) in the face of potentially catastrophic outcomes 
(2) where probabilities cannot be assigned and (3) when the loss, from following 
maximin, is a matter of relative indifference. Gardiner adds, sensibly, that to justify 
maximin, the threats that are potentially catastrophic must satisfy some minimal threshold 
of plausibility. If they can be dismissed as unrealistic, then maximin sho
d. Gardiner believes that the problem of global warming can be usefully analyzed 
in these terms and that it presents a good case for the application of maximin.  
This argument seems to me on the right track, but its conclusion, as stated, risks 
triviality, above all because of condition (3). If individuals and societies can eliminate an 
uncertain danger of catastrophe for essentially no cost, then of course they should 
eliminate that risk. But the real world rarely presents problems of this form. In real 
disputes, the elimination of uncertain dangers of catastrophe imposes both costs and risks. 
In the context of global warming, for example, it is implausible to say that regulatory 
choosers can or should care “very little, if anything,” for what might be lost by following 
maximin. If we followed maximin for global warming, we would spend a great deal to 
reduce greenhouse gas emissions, and the result would almost certainly be higher prices 
for gasoline and energy, probably producing increases in unemployment and poverty.  
                                                 
69 See Stephen Gardiner, The Core Precautionary Principle (unpublished manuscript 2003). 
70 See John Rawls, A Theory of Justice 134 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, revised edition 1999). 
am Fellner, Probability and Profit (Homewood, Ill., R.D. Irwin., Inc. 1965). Rawls draws in turn on Willi
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For environmental problems, does the argument for maximin provide help beyond 
the trivial cases? I believe that if properly reformulated, it does, for one simple reason: 
Condition (3) is too stringent and should be abandoned. Even if the costs of following 
maximin are significant, and even if choosers care a great deal about incurring those 
costs, i
 engage in 
further 
t makes sense to follow maximin when they face uncertain dangers of catastrophe. 
The hardest question here is: Under circumstances of uncertainty, how much cost does it 
make sense to incur in the service of maximin? Consider a straightforward case: The 
catastrophic dangers associated with global warming could be eliminated if every nation 
contributed $2 million to a fund to combat that risk. Surely that cost would be acceptable. 
Consider a very different case: The catastrophic dangers associated with global warming 
could be eliminated only if every nation contributed enough resources to reduce standards 
of living by 50% world-wide, with a corresponding increase in global poverty. If global 
warming really does pose an uncertain danger of total catastrophe, the logic of maximin 
argues in favor of this extraordinary reduction in world-wide standards of living; but it is 
not clear that following that logic would be reasonable. To incur costs of this magnitude, 
we might want to insist that the danger of catastrophe rises above a minimal threshold—
that there be demonstrable probability, and a not-so-low one, that the catastrophic risk 
will occur. It would seem far more sensible to take less costly steps now and to
research, attempting to learn enough to know more about the probability that the 
catastrophic outcomes will occur.71
                                                 
71 Sometimes the Precautionary Principle is urged in situations in which one or another course seems 
irreversible; and Posner attends to issues of reversibility in discussing global warming. But the issue of 
irreversibility raises many problems. Any death, of any living creature, is irreversible, and those who 
invoke irreversibility do not intend the notion of irreversible harm to apply to each and every mortality risk. 
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permanently lost. If government builds a new highway in upstate New York in May, that particular 
decision will be irreversible, even though the highway can be replaced or eliminated.  
Those who are concerned about irreversibility have something far more particular in mind. They 
mean something like a large-scale alteration in environmental conditions, one that imposes permanent, or 
nearly permanent, changes on those subject to them. But irreversibility in this sense is not a suffici
reason for a highly precautionary approach. At a minimum, the irreversible change has to be for the wor
ent 
se, 
and it must also rise to a certain level of magnitude. A truly miniscule change in the global temperature, 
even if permanent, would not justify expensive precautions if it is benign or if it imposes little in the way of 
harm. The idea of irreversibility is really important for two reasons. The first, referred to by Posner, draws 
 on (bounded) 
to 
on the analogy to stock options, and suggests that it is worthwhile to spend resources
precautions to wait for more information to emerge before incurring a substantial and irreversible loss. The 
second reason involves the relationship between irreversibility and catastrophic harm; a harm is unlikely 
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  problems. The Anti-Catastrophe Principle is not the 
Precautionary Principle; it is far narrower than that, and it covers only a small set of 
For global warming, Posner’s interesting recommendations seem vulnerable for 
this reason. Though a firm defender of quantification, he offers too little in the way of 
numbers here. To evaluate his proposal for new taxes on greenhouse gas emissions, 
designed to produce technological innovation, it would be valuable to know both the 
costs of that initiative and the likely benefits. Assessment of costs would not be easy, 
because we cannot project the rate of technological innovation; but if the taxes are 
significant, large increases should be expected in the price of energy, including gasoline, 
with particularly serious effects on poor people. Because of the range of uncertainties in 
the science of global warming, assessment of benefits is even harder. But at the very 
least, it should be possible to measure the likely effects of such taxes on greenhouse gas 
emissions. If the relevant taxes can be projected to spur significant reductions, then the 
argument for them is certainly strengthened.  
Unlike Posner, I suspect that the likelihood of real catastrophe from global 
warming is low, and hence that he is wrong to say that no probability can be assigned to 
it. But I am far from an expert on the underlying science, and in any case Posner 
convincingly argues that some kind of positive tax on carbon emissions would be cost-
justified. The larger point is that an Anti-Catastrophe Principle has a legitimate place in 
environmental regulation, applying to uncertain dangers of catastrophe, at least when the 
costs of reducing those dangers are not huge and when incurring those costs does not 
divert resources from more pressing
environmental problems. But it nonetheless deserves to play a role in environmental 
protection, plausibly including global warming—calling for significant (but not hugely 
costly) steps now, accompanied by further research to obtain a better understanding of the 
likelihood of real disaster. 
Four qualifications are important. First, the Anti-Catastrophe Principle must be 
attentive to the full range of social risks; it makes no sense to take steps to avert 
catastrophe if those very steps would create catastrophic risks of their own. Second, use 
of the principle should be closely attentive to the idea of cost-effectiveness, which 
                                                                                                                                                 
be catastrophic if it can be reversed. For discussion, see Cass R. Sunstein, Laws of Fear: Beyond the 
Precautionary Principle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, forthcoming 2005). 
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requires regulators to choose the least costly means of achieving their ends. In the context 
of global warming, there are many methods by which to reduce the relevant risks. Both 
nations and international institutions should choose those methods that minimize costs. 
Third, distributional considerations matter. The principle should be applied in a way that 
reduces extreme burdens on those least able to bear them. For global warming, there is a 
particular need to ensure that citizens of poor nations are not required to pay a great deal 
to contribute to the solution of a problem for which wealthy nations are most 
responsible—partly because the latter caused the problem in the first place, but also 
because poor people, faced with a global risk, need and deserve help from those who can 
provide it. Fourth, costs matter. The extent of precautions cannot reasonably be divorced 
from their expense. Where the worst-case scenario is truly catastrophic and when 
probabilities cannot be assigned, a large margin of safety makes a great deal of sense. 
e high costs might increase mortality and morbidity risks as a 
result.  
especially strong. In such cases, beneficiaries are unlikely to be helped if they are 
 
Conclusion 
 
 Because regulation itself often introduces new hazards, the Precautionary 
Principle risks incoherence; it forbids the very steps that it requires. For its part, CBA 
runs into two serious difficulties. The first involves the specification of both probabilities 
and outcomes. The second involves the translation of environmental risks into monetary 
equivalents.  
For many of the problems involved in environmental regulation, it is possible to 
identify a range of outcomes, in a way that allows CBA to get off the ground. But where 
catastrophic outcomes are possible and where regulators are operating under 
circumstances of uncertainty, it may well make sense to follow maximin. Even in such 
circumstances, however, an inquiry into costs cannot sensibly be avoided, not least 
because nations that impos
With respect to monetization, I have suggested that it is important to distinguish 
between the easy cases for using WTP and the harder ones. Where the beneficiaries of 
environmental regulation pay all or most of its cost, the argument for using WTP is 
required to pay more than they are willing to pay; and requiring them to do so is an insult 
38 
to their autonomy.72 But when the beneficiaries of environmental regulation pay little or 
none of the costs, the regulation might be justified even if it fails CBA. To decide 
whether it is, it is necessary to identify the likely winners and losers. The most general 
conclusion is that CBA does not tell regulators all that they need to know; but without it, 
they will know far too little.  
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